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This dissertation explores the intersecting topic of human rights and national export credit agencies 
(ECAs). As organisations actively seeking to promote foreign trade and investment, these organisations 
are in a prime position to set the bar for human rights conduct of Western corporations abroad. In order 
to evaluate ECAs’ human rights conduct, this thesis analyses how three European ECAs implement the 
OECD Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and Environmental and Social 
Due Diligence and the United Nation Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The analysis 
concludes that while compliance with the OECD Common Approaches is high, there are numerous 
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In 2003, a BP-led consortium of oil companies started building the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline, the ‘largest cross-border infrastructure construction project in the world’ at the time, designed 
to transport oil from the Caspian Sea to Western markets (IFC 2006, p.1). $2.7 billion of the total $4 
billion, corresponding to nearly 70% of the total cost, were guaranteed by public institutions, including 
in the UK and Germany (Lustgarten 2005, p.2). The BTC pipeline has since been named amongst the 
most controversial large-scale infrastructure projects (Lustgarten 2005, p.1; Scheper & Feldt 2010, p.9) 
which is inter alia due to the alleged human rights abuses committed by the oil companies during its 
construction. The alleged abuses include illegal use of land without payment of compensation; lack of 
public consultation; involuntary resettlement and intimidation (Lustgarten 2005, p.2). The BTC 
pipeline is just one of many potential examples of cases in which large multinational corporations 
receive governmental support through their countries’ export credit agencies (ECAs).  
This phenomenon highlights two interrelated problematic phenomena, namely firstly the activity of 
Western enterprises abroad potentially leading to human rights abuses, and secondly Western 
governments’ involvement in the process through their export credit agencies. The first of these issues 
is an expression of the widely referenced development of ‘globalisation.’ While the expansion of trade 
and production networks and investment flows is not a problem per se, these economic trends have 
come to be associated with a socio-economic ‘race to the bottom’ by producers (Hahnel 2000). This 
term describes the trend of Western producers moving their manufacturing sites to developing 
countries which have lower production costs. These cost reductions however are largely a result of 
lower wages and general labour standards. In an attempt to nevertheless secure this business for their 
own country, developing country governments and manufacturers enter the global ‘race to the bottom’, 
ever lowering standards in order to compete internationally. The devastating consequences for the 
living and working conditions of such workers are well documented.  The recent series of fatal 
catastrophes in Bangladeshi workhouses is only one of many such examples (CCC 2012; Dostert 2012; 
Steinberger 2012).   
From a legal and policy perspective, this development is moreover problematic as in most cases these 
international business operations fall into the so-called ‘governance gap.’ The concept of ’governance 
gap’ (see e.g. Kinley 2009, pp.157–169; Ruggie 2008, para.3, 13 and 14; Voiculescu & Yanacopulos 
2011, pp.1–2) describes the situation in which entities (in this case transnational corporations) fall 
outside the realm of effective government control. This can be the case with corporations when their 
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operations occur outside their home state, and the latter therefore considers these operations outside its 
jurisdiction. Host states on the other hand frequently lack the capacity or the political will to enforce 
stringent social standards on foreign business enterprises. The governance gap is especially relevant to 
large transnational corporations (TNCs). The term is here used to describe businesses which are 
incorporated in one country but operate, directly or through subsidiaries, in countries other than their 
‘home’ state. The literature generally distinguishes between ‘home’ and ‘host’ states, to refer to the 
company’s country of incorporation and operation respectively. This distinction often corresponds to 
developed and developing countries. Whilst these classifications are very helpful means of 
systematising some overall trends, it should be borne in mind that these are simplifications. South-
south economic cooperation is increasing in significance (Agarwal 2013) and thus blurring the line 
between developed states as home states and developing states as host states. Complex arrangements 
between parent companies and subsidiaries further complicate the picture, in that the ties between the 
parent companies (largely located in developed states) and its subsidiaries carrying out the operations 
abroad can be obscure.  
 
Why focus on ECAs? 
As such, ECAs represent a fascinating research angle on the field of business and human rights. As 
state-controlled entities which work directly with and provide a service to multinational businesses, 
these organisations are interesting vehicles for transforming state policy into business practice. Unlike 
the vast number of the operations of multinationals which operate independent of direct state-support 
and funding and which both companies and governments frequently argue are outside individual states’ 
jurisdictions, the conditions which ECAs impose on their clients are entirely in the hand of 
governments.  Moreover, it is in the nature of the projects that are supported by ECAs to be especially 
risky. By definition this applies to the political and/or financial conditions under which they are carried 
out. However, such political and/or financial risks frequently go hand in hand with a particularly 
precarious human rights situation (Utlu 2013, pp.2–3). For example if a project was denied commercial 
funding due to the fact that it is situated in a politically volatile region on the brink of civil war, it is a 
straightforward assumption that it will be difficult to effectively safeguard all human rights of workers 
and the affected communities in the area. The same connection applies to e.g. a dam project that is an 
economic risk due to the fact that the plans require the resettlement of surrounding villages. Connected 
to this situation, there is a history of ECAs lending support to projects in industrial sectors which have 
been known to have a particularly problematic human rights record. This includes large infrastructure 
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projects such as dams or power stations (Utlu 2013, p.1), as well as oil and gas (Hildyard 2013, p.2). It 
should be emphasised that highlighting these areas does not imply that other industry sectors are not 
also problematic. Finally, the global financial crisis of the recent years made the activities of ECAs 
more pertinent that ever. Following the private sector’s ability to maintain its pre-crisis levels of 
lending and insurance, officially supported agencies stepped in to fill the gap (Berne Union 2013, p.4; 
FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 2013, p.4). ECA Watch reports on increases in ECAs portfolios between 
30 and 272 per cent as well as an increase of ECAs’ financial capacity through their respective states 
(FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 2013, p.4).  
 
Outline of the Study 
The aim of the study is to gain an understanding of how Western European ECAs are implementing 
relevant human rights guidelines. Before embarking on this analysis, we will examine which literature 
is already available on this topic. This turns out to be rather scarce, with only a small number of NGOs 
and other organisations having conducted actual studies analysing ECAs’ conduct with regards to 
human rights. Therefore, this paper will examine existing explanations for states’ compliance with 
international norms more generally, including human rights. Subsequently, we will look at the existing 
studies on ECAs and human rights. The methodology employed is a multiple-case study of three 
Western European NGOs. Their policies and practices were examined through written material 
available through their websites which was analysed using qualitative content analysis. The paper 
provides an outline of the relevant international human rights guidelines, before examining the ECAs’ 
conduct. Having analysed to which extent and how these agencies comply with the existing 
recommendations, we will apply the theoretical models examined above to offer some explanations of 
the organisational behaviour. The study concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for 
further research on the topic.  
 
Research Questions 
1. How and to which extent are Western European ECAs implementing relevant human rights 
regulations? 




2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A major part of what motivated this study was precisely the lack of academic literature on the topic of 
export credit agencies and human rights. While this is mostly an opportunity to explore an area that has 
previously not received a lot of attention, it also poses some challenges in terms of finding background 
material. However, what has been well researched is the implementation of international norms, 
including human rights in particular, in the national context. We believe that these offer valuable 
background insights, and much of the knowledge gained in this broader area is also relevant to the 
more specific context of export credit agencies. Besides this academic literature on norm 
implementation, there are also a number studies by NGOs and one research institution on export credit 
agencies and human rights. These will be consulted subsequently.  
 
2.1 Theories on National Implementation of International Norms 
In the following I will outline two sets of theoretical models that have been developed to explain why 
states do or do not comply with international norms, in particular human rights. The models are 
institutionalism on the one hand and a combination of regime theory and the transnational legal process 
model on the other. Subsequently there will be a comparative summary of the two models, exploring 
how these might apply to export credit agencies.  
 
Institutionalism 
Institutionalism is in many ways developed out of a realist world view. This manifests in a number of 
ways, but perhaps most importantly in the shared belief that states are unified actors and a largely 
motivated by self-interest (Hathaway 2002, pp.1947–48). This self-interest has been defined as ‘at a 
minimum […] own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Waltz 2010). 
According to realists, international politics is thus characterised by a state of anarchy in which states 
are pitched against each other in a struggle to further their respective interests. Institutions and rules 
play no role in their own right. Although institutionalist theorists too believe that the international stage 
is governed by a state of anarchy at the outset, they stress the potential benefit of mutual cooperation. 
Thus, states have the option of founding international regimes which allow states to cooperate to 
achieve their long-term goals (Keohane 1998). In this view, states might join and comply with 
international regimes because they see this to be in their own interest. This point has given rise to some 
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doubts regarding the applicability of institutionalist thought to human rights. Since the relations that are 
being regulated are state-internal, a given state does not draw any direct benefit from another state’s 
compliance, or contrary damage from non-compliance. This is contrasted with ‘international 
institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental or security policy [which are designed primarily] 
to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders’ (Moravcsik 2000, 
p.217). Neumayer observes that compliance mechanisms must work fundamentally different for such a 
regime, as contrary to e.g. the trade regime, sanctions are never ‘self-enforcing’ in the sense that the 
‘threatening group of countries is better of actually executing the sanction’ (2005, p.927). Louis Henkin 
adds that “the principal element of horizontal deterrence is missing [in the area of human rights]: the 
threat that ‘if you violate the human rights of your inhabitants, we will violate the human rights of our 
inhabitants’ hardly serves as a deterrent” (1989, p.253, in Hathaway 2002, p.2007).  
 
Regime Theory & Transnational Legal Process Model 
Regime Theory 
Regime theory has been described as ‘refinement from institutionalism’ (Neumayer 2005, p.928). 
However, there are several significant differences. Probably the most significant of these is the fact that 
regime theorists such as Chayes and Chayes believe that an international treaty creates a binding 
obligation which states are likely to obey in its own right and not exclusively due to an interest or a fear 
of punishment (1993, p.185). This is expressed in the concept of pacta sunt servanda1. Another key 
factors is that states are not seen as homogenous actors with a unified agenda and interests. Rather a 
multitude of state ministries and individuals within them, as well as often civil society actors weigh in 
on crafting the country’s position (Chayes & Chayes 1993, p.181).   
They offer a number of reasons for the premise of pacta sunt servanda. Firstly, due to the length and 
cost involved in the process of a policy change, the authors argue that states are likely to stick with one 
course of actions once it has officially been decided upon (1993, pp.179&186). Secondly, states enter 
treaties out of their own free will and more importantly, treaties usually come about as an outcome of 
intense inter-state discussions and negotiations. This process allows states to exert their influence 
towards fashioning the treaty according to their own interests. These interactions are likely to lead 
states to thoroughly think through, and potentially even reconsider their positions (1993, p.180). Franck 
                                                          
1
 ‘The rule that agreements and stipulations, esp. those contained in treaties, must be observed’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, in 
Hathaway 2002, p.1956) 
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(2006) adds to this that part of the reason why nations follow rules is because they perceive them to be 
legitimate. He defines ‘legitimacy’ as “the capacity of a rule to pull those to whom it is addressed 
towards consensual compliance” (Franck 2006, p.93).  
As a result, non-compliance, in this view, is usually not due to a lack of will to comply, but rather due 
to a lack of capacity, or understanding on behalf of the non-compliant state or due to the fact that many 
of the changes envisaged in international treaties are long-term developments which simply take time 
to realise (Chayes & Chayes 1993, pp.188–197). The response, so the authors argue, is to engage in 
persuasive discourse with the offending states to convince it to act according to the law. Thus, the idea 
is that it is not instrumental self-interest that drives states to comply (or not), but rather a process of 
international socialisation that leads to this outcome. They qualify this assertion with the statement that 
compliance need not be ‘strict’, but must simply meet a level that is “ ‘acceptable’ in the light of the 
interest and concern the treaty is designed to safeguard” (Chayes & Chayes 1993, p.176). The authors 
themselves however also admit that human rights are the areas of international law in which it is most 
likely that ‘a state will enter into an international agreement to appease a domestic or international 
constituency but have little intention of carrying it out’ (Chayes & Chayes 1993, pp.187–188).  
 
Transnational Legal Process Model 
The transnational legal process model (TLPM) does not stand in contrast with regime theory, but rather 
seeks to add to it. This model, developed by Harold Koh (1997), focuses on the process of norm-
internalisation. He openly builds upon the theories developed by Chayes & Chayes and Franck, but 
argues that the above skipped the step which falls between international norms being debated on the 
international stage and subsequently obeyed by states. He argues that in between the process of norm-
internalisation occurs (1997, p.2602). The transnational legal process model focuses on how the 
international norms, including those in treaties, become internalised by actors at the state level. He 
proposes a three state process (1997, p.2646). The transaction starts when one transnational actor 
initiatives an interaction with another, which is followed by an exchange which leads to an 
interpretation and often a formal formulation (even in treaty form) of the new norm. Thirdly, the other 
actor internalises the new norm, as a result of the interactions. Once an actor has internalised a norm he 
or she will be part of the domestic process which leads to the internalisation of the norm at the national 
state level. Such transnational actors, can be diplomats, NGOs or even private people (1997, p.2648). It 
is important to note however, that while this is how norm-internalisation can occur, there is by no 
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means a guarantee. Thus, this theory offers little predictive value as to why certain norms come to be 
internalised and others not (Hathaway 2002, pp.1961–62).  
 
Comparison 
The two sets of theories (henceforth regime theory and the transnational legal process model will be 
collectively referred to as one ‘theory’) explore and make assumptions about various aspects of state 
behaviour in relation to international norms and regimes.  
The first regard the basic view of the state and assumptions about its interests. While institutionalists 
see the state as a unified actor on the international stage who is motivated by self-interest, adherents of 
regime theory and the TLPM would argue that also internationally the state has to be seen as an 
aggregation of its individual actors. Therefore, in this view the interest and position of the state are a lot 
less unified or defined, and usually open to negotiation and influence.  
A second core difference is the importance that these theories attribute to the processes of international 
interaction. For institutionalists the international arena is one in which states seek to maximise their 
own interest, either at the expense of one another or collaboratively via international regimes and 
institutions. There is no indication however, that these interactions have any effect on how states define 
their interest. For regime theorists and the TLPM on the other hand, these international processes are 
key. This is where ideas are raised, debated, reframed and actors eventually become persuaded, which 
in turn serves to filter back into the definition of the national-interest and subsequent state behaviour.  
This last point already touches upon the different motivations for complying with international norms. 
Institutionalists would argue that if states comply with international norms this is the case because it 
serves their own interests. This can either be the case because the actual norm-compliant behaviour is 
beneficial for them, or because the effect of compliance mechanisms makes it the politically astute 
choice. The other group of theorists would however argue that compliance is due to conviction and a 
basic respect for international laws.   
These contrasting views provide us several points which will subsequently applied to the analysis. 
Firstly, it will be interesting to observe whether there are indicators that the state position is the 
outcome of a negotiation or compromise between different actors and subject to further negotiation, or 
whether it is firmly grounded in an understanding of ‘national interest’. Secondly, we can examine 
which role the processes of international interaction appear to play. Are there indications that the length 
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or intensity of the processes leading up to an international guideline influence the degree to which it is 
subsequently applied? And thirdly, which explanations can we find for whether or not states are 
complying. Does compliance yield political or economic benefits, or is non-compliance punished by 
effective mechanisms? Or are there indications that states comply out of conviction and a fundamental 
respect for norms?  
 
 
2.2 Previous Studies on Export Credit Agencies and Human Rights 
Critical Reviews of ECAs 
Previous studies on ECAs and human rights draw out a number of critical points, mostly focused on 
national contexts.  
Amnesty International UK 
In June 2013, Amnesty International UK published a report titled ‘A History of Neglect – UK Export 
Finance and Human Rights’ which gives a critical view of the United Kingdom’s practice of export 
promotion with regards to human rights. Amnesty presents a number of illustrations of UKEF’s policy 
and practice which they argue amount to a failure of the British state to fulfil its ‘duty to protect’ under 
international human rights law (2013, p.3). A lot of the critique is tied to the fact that in 2010 the 
government decided to replace its previous ‘Business Principles’ for UKEF with the policy to follow 
the OECD Common Approaches (2013, p.11). This decision effectively meant a downgrading of the 
ECA’s policies and practice which hitherto had gone beyond this lowest-common-denominator 
agreement. Following this change in policy, UKEF no longer reviews projects for their environmental 
and social impacts if they fall below the threshold specified in the Common Approaches2. With this 
change, Amnesty claims, UKEF relinquished its position of international leadership on human rights 
issues and export support and the agency’s ethical standards are now frequently lower than those of its 
international counter-parts (2013, pp.17–18). Amnesty is also critical of a new product which UKEF 
introduced in 2009, namely the Letter of Credit Guarantee Scheme. Under this scheme, UKEF supports 
exports indirectly via British banks, thereby effectively avoiding any ethical review (2013, p.15). 
Further contentious points are that UKEF’s lack of transparency and reluctance in complying with 
                                                          
2
 The OECD Common Approaches state that ECAs should review projects which have a repayment term of two years or 
more and the ECA’s exposure amounts to £10 million or the project is in or near a sensitive area (Amnesty International 
2013, p.12). The OECD Common Approaches will be outlined in more detail in the section below.  
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Freedom of Information requests (2013, pp.19–20). It has also been remarked that the policies of 
UKEF and those of the rest of government, especially Parliament, seem disjointed. Thus, UKEF is not 
integrated with much of the government’s human rights policy and appears deaf to Parliamentary 
critique (2013, pp.16&26). Further points raised include UKEF’s share of third world debt and its 
practice of supporting the arms trade (2013, pp.2&6).   
 
Feldt and Scheper 
A further study by Christian Scheper and Heidi Feldt  (2010) is the main academic work available on 
the topic, focusing on the German state’s practice on export credits and foreign investment promotion. 
The study takes a wide-angled approach to the topic, including international guidelines issued by the 
Berne Union and the OECD aimed at ensuring that official export credit support does not have a 
distorting function on market conditions. In the field of environmental and social guidelines for export 
credits, the authors examine the OECD Common Approaches (in their 2007 revision) as well as the 
standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank which these refer to 
(2010, pp.38–48). The authors go on to examine which ethical standards also to the less well regulated 
investment guarantees (2010, pp.48–50). Scheper and Feldt analyse the extent to which international 
human rights are covered by these standards, finding that although the World Bank group instruments 
in particular do include reference to a number of human rights issues, none of the documents previews 
a systematic human rights analysis (Scheper & Feldt 2010, pp.52–53).   
 
ECA-Watch 
The third study, ‘Still Exporting Destruction’, is a shadow report by ECA-Watch and other European 
NGOs. The report aims to assess ECAs’ compliance with the December 2011 European Union 
Regulation approving the incorporation of the revised text of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) arrangement on officially supported export credits into EU law 
(ECA regulation) (FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 2013, p.3). Under the regulation, ECAs must report 
their activities to the European Commission, in order for the EU body to assess whether or not the 
agencies have been complying with EU objectives, which include the ‘external action provisions’ 
(FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 2013, p.3). The ECA regulation states that the EU’s ‘Member States 
should comply with the Union's general provisions on external action, such as consolidating 
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democracy, respect for human rights and policy coherence for development, and the fight against 
climate change, when establishing, developing and implementing their national export credit systems 
and when carrying out their supervision of officially supported export credit activities’ (EU 2011, p.3). 
Although the EU reporting system in place is a positive first step, it still shows significant short-
comings. Principal amongst these was the delay in involving the European Parliament in the process, 
and most of all the lack of a clear set of benchmarks to assess ECAs’ compliance with the EU 
requirements (FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 2013, p.21). The report furthermore stresses the need to 
oversee ECA conduct, based on the ‘main problems associated with export credits [which] include the 
exacerbation of heavily indebted countries’ debt problems, negative impacts on human rights, and 
support to projects that increase greenhouse gas emissions’ (2013, p.4).  
ECA-Watch is critical of existing regulation of ECAs, which is largely based on voluntary 
commitments (the OECD Common Approaches) that would not be sufficient to systematically ensure 
the respect of the whole range of internationally agreed human rights even if they were fully applied 
(2013, p.9).  
 
Recommendations 
Scheper & Feldt observe that many relevant human rights are already implicitly contained in applicable 
standards and are therefore considered in project assessments. However, they recommend that the state 
could to more to promote an explicit reference to international human rights standards (2010, 
pp.55&64–65). This should occur, i.a. by the ECA including an explicit reference to human rights in its 
criteria for export credit support (Scheper & Feldt 2010, p.76). Amnesty makes a similar point, 
recommending that ‘all agencies and departments promoting trade and investment should demonstrate 
awareness of the UK’s human rights obligaitons and the necessity for human rights due diligence in all 
cases of business support’ (Amnesty International 2013, p.28). 
A second point made by both Feldt and Scheper ECA (2010, pp.59–61) and Amnesty (Amnesty 
International 2013, p.28) is the need to increase the transparency of the ECA’s operation to enable an 
effective oversight of the whole process, from initial project screening to ongoing monitoring of 
operations. They suggest that especially Parliament (and through it NGOs) must obtain a formalised 
role in the oversight of the ECA (Scheper & Feldt 2010, pp.59–61). Amnesty moreover stressed the 
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point of policy coherence, stating that the government should ensure that UKEF’s policies are in line 
with the rest of the government’s on human rights.  
A third key point made in both studies is the creation of an independent complaints mechanism for 
victims (Amnesty International 2013, p.28; Scheper & Feldt 2010, pp.62&80). 
ECA-Watch focuses on the EU level, stressing the need for the European Commission to enhance its 
monitoring practice to effectively ‘check that ECAs have policies in place that are effective  for 
ensuring that the ECA’s activities accord with EU objectives’ (2013, p.5). The NGO moreover calls on 
the European Commission to be more open about the limits it currently faces to effectively monitoring 
ECA compliance with the regulation, which it states currently still lacks ‘an analysis of the gaps 





















Case studies have several identified strengths compared to statistical other methodologies. Amongst the 
strengths identified by Bennett and George (2005, p.19) are ‘conceptual validity. The case study 
method has moreover been attested suitability for answering a descriptive or an explanatory question, 
i.e. seeking to understand what or why something is happening (Yin 2012, p.5). This is clearly the case 
in study here which is foremost a descriptive exercise, trying to describe what ECAs are doing in 
relation to certain international guidelines. Moreover, multiple-case studies allow for some degree of 
compromise between the depth of qualitative single case analysis and the representativeness of 
quantitative work (George & Bennett 2005, p.31). Of course, seeking an element of the best of both 
worlds, also requires trade-offs in either direction. It is important to stress in this context that although 
a multiple-case study may allow for some degree of contingent generalisation, it certainly does not aim 
to establish the level of universality of representativeness associated with quantitative studies which are 
based on a large, random sample (George & Bennett 2005, pp.30–31; Yin 2012, p.7).  
Case studies moreover score high on measures of conceptual validity, i.e. the ability to ‘identify and 
measures the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure’. 
This is the so as a comparative case study approach allows for ‘contextualised comparison’, i.e. 
identifying in each situation which indicators correspond most closely to the concept they are seeking 
to measure  (Yin 2012, p.8).  
 
Case selection 
Unlike in quantitative research, qualitative research does not necessarily require random sampling. 
Thus it is the researcher who is to make an informed and purposeful decision on which sites to study 
and how to delimit the study (Creswell 2003, p.185).  
The case selection for this thesis was motivated by a number of factors. Firstly, the cases were drawn 
from a relatively homogenous group, namely Western European states. All three countries examined 
are OECD members, have a high compliance record for human rights and are wealthy, exporting 
countries. Within this ‘sample’
3
 I selected two ‘representative’ cases (Germany and the UK) and one 
‘extreme’ case (the Netherlands) (Bryman 2008, pp.54–56). The Netherlands count as extreme case as 
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they had previously been mentioned by experts as particularly advanced with regards to their ECA’s 
human rights practice (Utlu 2013). The idea was to combine typical cases with one that presented 
alternative behaviour, in an attempt to gain some deeper insights into the patterns of ECA conduct and 
motivations.  
Within the broader Western European context, the choice of the UK and Germany was further 
motivated by the personal motivation that the researcher has lived for extended periods in both 
countries and is fluent with the languages.  
 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
Content analysis developed as a mostly quantitative method, which built upon rigorous coding 
exercises (word-counting, to put it rather simplistically). However, the use of this method has 
since broadened out substantially, and the variant used here is qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative content analysis has been described as comprising ‘a searching-out of underlying 
themes in the materials being analysed […]. The processes through which the themes are 
extracted is often not specified in detail. The extracted themes are usually illustrated’ for example 
by quotations (Bryman 2008, p.529). Thus, content analysis can be used to identify i.a. ‘themes’ 
and ‘topics’ covered in a text, which in this case will be information on whether and how ECAs 
are implementing the relevant guidelines (Berg 2007, p.308). Researchers have stressed that 
content analysis is not limited to ‘manifest’ content, i.e. messages which are directly stated in the 
text. Rather, researchers may also examine ‘latent’ content, or circumscriptions or hints (Fr h 
2007, p.52). The key is to keep using a systematic and objective approach. It should be borne in 
mind that content analysis is not a strategy for identifying or testing causal relationships, for this a 
broader quantitative approach would be required (Berg 2007, p.328). Content analysis, especially 
in the form it is employed here, gives qualitative understanding of cases and may offer some 
guesses at correlations.  
 
Source Critique 
The sources consulted for this study were, besides the actual texts of the guidelines, in first line 
ECA publications, i.e. annual and other reports publicly available, as well as other pertinent 
information published on the agency websites. Bryman identified that one of the advantages of 
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conducting such a document-based study is that the documents were not specifically produced for 
the purpose of the research and are therefore not reactive (Bryman 2008, p.515). 
Probably the greatest hurdle to this study has been the scarcity of information on ECA practice. This 
lack of ECAs’ transparency has been commented on by various sources (FERN & ECA-Watch Europe 
2013; Hildyard 2013; Utlu 2013). As a result, I have had to mostly resort on publicly available 
documents that can be found on the ECAs’ websites, as well as on some secondary information 
obtained from NGOs. However, the sources of information have been too limited to fully satisfy 
established criteria for ensuring trustworthiness or credibility of a study (Bryman 2008, p.377).  A 
common way of ensuring such credibility would be the use of triangulation, i.e. confirming 
information through different, independent sources, ideally three or more (Yin 2012, p.13). However, 
given the limit of information available this has usually not been possible.  
However, following Scott, as official documents, ECA publications rank high on scores such as 
authenticity and meaning. Scott (1990, in Bryman 2008, p.516) suggest four criteria for assessing a 
document’s quality in a social science research context. They are authenticity, i.e. whether the 
‘evidence [is] genuine and of unquestionable origin’; credibility, ie. whether ‘the evidence [is] free 
from error and distortion; representativeness, i.e. whether the ‘evidence [is] typical of its kind, and, if 
not, [whether] the extent of its untypicality [is] known’ and fourth, meaning, i.e. whether the ‘evidence 
[is] clear and comprehensible’. 
While this clearly involves some issues, mostly in terms of limits to the information available and bias. 
While it is a reasonable assumption that the information obtained from the ECA websites, which are 
public bodies, is factually correct, there is still reason for caution. Firstly, the ECAs will be wishing to 
present themselves in a positive light and thus may somewhat overemphasise the importance they place 
on social standards and human rights. The findings of ECA Watch, that when cross checking different 
ECA reports figures do not always add up, gives further room to caution (2013). NGO information on 
the other hand may be prone to be overly critical.  
Although it has been impossible to eliminate these issues in this study, I have sought to be aware of 
them and limit their distorting impact. Wherever possible I have cross-checked information against 
different sources, and generally have remained aware of the source of information and the likely 
purpose behind writing and publishing it when analysing the data obtained. A further advantage of 
using documents, compared to e.g. interviews, is that that attention will have gone into compiling the 
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written record. Such material can therefore be considered to be relatively well thorough and well 
thought through (Creswell 2003, p.187).  
 
Ethical Issues 
By the standards of social science research, the ethics of this study are relatively unproblematic. This is 
the mainly the case as the subject matter is not individuals’ personal or private lives, but an aspect of 
public policy. Also, compared with for instance participant observation or ethnography, interviews and 
of course document analysis, are relatively unobtrusive research method (Creswell 2003, p.202).  
Nevertheless, certain standards and norms must considered and respected.  
The most important cluster of aspects of the ethics debate can be subsumed under the heading of 
‘truth’. It seems a very obvious point to make that all evidence should be portrayed truthfully, doing 
justice to the facts and respondent’s point of view, and without bias. However, this is a lot easier said 
than done. It is one thing not to wilfully distort data, or make factual errors such as misattributing 
quotes. Either of those actions would clearly be unethical, but may be avoided quite easily. However, 
there is the very important ethical issue of personal bias. Personal bias and values are bound to impact 
all stages of a research project, from the choice of the theme to the presentation and analysis of the 
data. A large problem with personal bias is that a lot of its influence can occur subconsciously. 
Personal bias may skew the researcher such that he/she will implicitly favour one perspective over 
another, without actually manipulating data to an extent that would be factually erroneous. This may 
express itself in anything from the choice of wording, the space one side is given over another, the 
interpretation of data and so forth. Whilst this sort of bias is of course not desirable, the social sciences 
have moved away from the belief that it is possible to completely control for the influence of personal 
bias on a research project. Experienced researchers have argued that it is virtually impossible for a 
researcher to detach oneself completely from one’s own values and preconceptions (Bryman 2008, 
pp.24–25). Whilst it has thus been agreed that values cannot be eradicated, this does not mean they 
should not actively be taken into account. The approach to this issue taken here is that of disclosure and 
reflexivity (Bryman 2008, p.25). Reflexivity essentially refers to the process by which the researcher 
firstly reflects on the expectations, attitudes and aims that he/she has with regards to the research topic 
and secondly discloses these to the reader.  
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On the topic of disclosure I should record at this point that my educational and professional background 
has certainly had a strong influence on this study. My university studies have been in political sciences 
followed by a Masters course on ‘Human rights practice’. Already during my undergraduate studies I 
encountered views that were very critical of the structures of the international political economy in 
general and Western states role within it in particular. My Masters naturally involved extended and 
intense studies of international human rights in law and in practice. Although these studies were not 
uncritical, the overarching tone has been very supportive to the basic idea of universal human rights. 
These positions were further supported by the practical experience that I have had in various UK NGOs 
and with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. This background has 
certainly predisposed me towards the side of the ‘underdog’, in this case the unidentified workers and 
community members that may in some way be affected by the exports and investments supported by 
the ECAs. On the other hand, I view the actions and motives of the ECAs and corresponding 
governments with a substantial degree of scepticism with regards to their approach to human rights.  
Nevertheless, I have endeavoured to treat both sides fairly and to not let this predisposition allow me to 
skew any evidence against the ECAs. In order to achieve this I have consulted with both members of 
critical NGOs as well as the ECAs themselves. Throughout the study I seek to present all of the 
information supporting the arguments on both sides and to be as open as possible as to my reasoning 












4. BACKGROUND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECAS 
4.1 The International Human Rights Regime In Relation To ECAs 
The international human rights system which is referenced in this paper has been developing since 
1945, following the end of World War II. At the core of this system is the ‘International Bill of Rights’, 
which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). These cover the range of existing human rights, which since has been further 
developed through additional treaties which expand on particular rights (e.g. torture; enforced 
disappearance and religious discrimination) or specify the applicability of all rights to particular groups 
(e.g. women; children or migrant workers). International human rights law consists of treaties which 
obtain legal status through states’ consent to be bound by them (ratification) (Smith 2010). The UDHR, 
while not formally binding due to its legal status as a ‘Declaration’, has since been gradually obtaining 
the status of ‘customary law’ due to its wide dispersion and acceptance (Smith 2010, p.37). 
International human rights treaties are to a large degree developed at the international level, under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN). Regional bodies, including the European Union (EU), have 
additional human rights systems. This study will generally draw on the universal, i.e. UN human rights 
regime, which is also the system referenced in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. In some cases which will be specified, we will also consult the EU system.  
The basic notion of human rights is that they are entitlements, i.e. something that everyone has a 
legitimate claim to by virtue of being born (Freeman 2002; UN 1948, para.1–2). States have the duty to 
protect and/or provide the content of these rights. As such, the fundamental relationship between the 
individual as rights holder and the state as duty bearers is rather straightforward. The definition of the 
‘state’ in international law includes ECAs. The International Commission of Jurists (ILC) (2002, Art.5) 
specifies that ‘The conduct of a person or entity […] which is empowered by the law of that State to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law […]’. As ECAs act upon a public mandate, regardless of whether they are integrated 
into government ministries or private bodies, they are considered state actors in international law and 
therefore have the same human rights duties.  
The basic principle of human rights law assumes that there are states which are responsible for the 
individuals within their jurisdiction. The responsibility extends to both protecting said individuals and 
ensuring that they themselves do not abuse other people’s human rights. In the national context this 
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occurs via the legal and court systems, which provide monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
However, as has been touched upon in the introduction, this picture has been complicated by 
international trade and financial relations. Thus, there are large, frequently Western, companies that are 
registered in one country but conduct their manufacturing, construction or other operations abroad. In 
such cases the question arises of who is responsible for safeguarding the human rights of the people 
affected by such business projects, in the first place the workers and surrounding communities. These 
situations in which the problems associated with a governance gap, i.e. the absence of any regulating 
state power which is clearly and effectively in control, manifest themselves (see introduction). 
From a purely legal perspective it is generally the host states that are responsible (Bernstorff 2010, 
p.25). However, systematic and disastrous shortcomings of effective host state control have given rise 
to political pressure for effective extraterritorial control of home states over the operations of their 
businesses abroad (Bernstorff 2010; Kinley 2009, pp.189–193). The area of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is both legally controversial as well as highly politicised. There have been some limited advances in 
this area, mostly related to international criminal law. The bottom line nevertheless remains that as of 
today we remain a far way off from effective extraterritorial (or alternatively international) jurisdiction 
on human rights matters (Bernstorff 2010).  
This is not to say that governments have no obligations whatsoever, or at least regulatory possibilities 
with regards to the conduct of their corporations abroad. There is the evolving concept of ‘due 
diligence’ which will be considered in more detail in the context of the international guidelines 
examined below. Secondly, home states are legally permitted to regulate the activity of their 
corporations abroad, provided this is in compliance with international law (Bernstorff 2010, p.25). 
Thirdly, there are also instances in which home state conduct may amount to aiding or assisting an 
international wrongful act, as defined in Article 16 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC 2002). Article 16 states that ‘A State which aids or assists 
another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State’. This article contains a number of conditions in order to find a violation of the home state’s duty 
of care. Thus, firstly, the home state must commit some act to assist the host state in violating human 
rights and secondly this must occur with the knowledge of the home state of doing so. Export credit 
support for projects which will predictably lead to human rights violations by the host country have 




4.2 International Human Rights Guidelines for Export Credit Agencies 
A number of international bodies have issued guidelines and regulations for the operations of ECAs. 
The most significant of these are those issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU) and the 
International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers (Berne Union). Their output and recognition has 
been such that authors have started referring to a body of international law on official export credit 
support (Wolfram 2004, p.24). However, the majority of these focus on the financial aspects of ECAs’ 
operations. Thus, the focus here will be on two sets of guidelines issued by the OECD and the UN 
respectively. The OECD is the author of the only regulation which is exclusively focused on the social 
and environmental conduct, which includes human rights issues, of ECAs. The UN has issued a set of 
‘Guiding Principles’ which focuses on the human rights conduct of businesses, and makes a direct 
mention of human rights.  As was discussed above and as analysed by ECA-Watch, the EU has also 
passed legislation which indirectly binds ECAs to EU human rights standards. However, since this was 
analysed so recently4 and the EU human rights system does not add significantly to the substance of 
human rights covered under the universal system, the focus here will be on the guidelines issued by the 
OECD and the UN. In the following we will explore these guidelines and also establish their legal 
status and outline the major difference in substance between the two regulations.  
 
OECD Common Approaches 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been described as being 
the most important international governmental organisation in practice that deals with the international 
coordination and harmonisation of official export credit support (Wolfram 2004, p.28). This is largely 
the case as the OECD includes the economically most powerful countries in the world, irrespective of 
regional groupings such as within the EU. Simultaneously its membership is not as large as that of the 
WTO which makes the latter body slower to reach agreements.  
The most relevant OECD standards for the purposes of this paper are the Common Approaches for 
Officially Supported Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence (the ‘Common 
Approaches’) which were first adopted in 2001 and have since been regularly updated, most recently in 
                                                          
4
 Since Feldt and Scheper’s study the OECD Guidelines have been reviewed. Moreover, their study only covered Germany.  
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2012 (OECD 2012a). The stated goal of the Common Approaches it to harmonise the application of 
environmental and social standards by members, thereby increasing the observation of these standards 
and preventing a distortion of competition by unequal application of standards by different national 
ECAs (OECD 2012b, para.3). The Common Approaches apply to all officially supported export credits 
with a minimum repayment term of two years. Military equipment and agricultural products are 
excluded (OECD 2012b, para.2). The Common Approaches define ‘social impacts’ as the ‘project-
related impacts on the local communities directly affected by the project and on the people involved in 
the construction and operation of the project; these social impacts encompass relevant adverse project-
related human rights impacts’ (OECD 2012b, p.5).  
In order to achieve the goals, members pledged to ‘undertake appropriate environmental and social 
reviews and assessments for projects and existing operations respectively, as part of their due diligence 
relating to applications for officially supported export credits’ (OECD 2012b, para.4(ii)). Moreover, 
members should ‘encourage protection and respect for human rights, particularly in situations where 
the potential impacts from projects or existing operations pose risks to human rights’ (OECD 2012b, 
para.4(iv)). The Common Approaches furthermore stress the importance of transparency (para.4(v)) 
and the application of the referenced international standards (para.4(vii)).  
In the first stage, based on information by the applicants, the ECAs should identify all projects that 
should be subjected to further categorisation. This includes all applications for new projects and 
projects that have undergone substantive changes which are in or near sensitive areas (para.6). All 
projects in which the member’s share is equal or above SDR 10 million5 should automatically be 
subject to screening (paras.7&8).  
Those projects which have been selected for classification are then divided into one of three categories: 
A, B or C. ECAs should identify positive and negative environmental and social impacts of the project. 
Social impacts may include ‘labour and working conditions, community health, safety, and security, 
land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, cultural heritage, and project-related 
human rights impacts, including forced labour, child labour, and life-threatening occupational health 
and safety situations’ (OECD 2012b, para.10). Category A refers to a project which ‘has the potential 
to have significant adverse environmental and/or social impacts, which are diverse, irreversible and/or 
                                                          
5
 SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) are an artificial currency, manufactured by the IMF. The value of 1 SDR is calculated on a 
daily basis and is a combination of the euro, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling and the US dollar (IMF 2013a). On 28 





unprecedented. […]’ (2012b, para.11). Projects in or near to sensitive areas are included by principle. A 
project falls into Category B ‘if its potential environmental and/or social impacts are less adverse than 
those of Category A projects. Typically, these impacts are few in number, site-specific, few if any are 
irreversible, and mitigation measures are more readily available’ (2012b, para.11). A project is 
classified as Category C ‘if it has minimal or no potentially adverse environmental and/or social 
impacts’ (2012b, para.11). The Annex I of the Common Approaches contains an illustrative list of 
typical category A projects which is reproduced in the annex to this paper. The environmental and 
social review of the project should include benchmarking the project, and to the extent relevant and 
possible any associated facilities, against the relevant international standards and a consideration of 
measures to prevent, mitigate or remedy adverse impacts.  
Following this classification, members may require the applicants to provide an Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). For category A projects, such an ESIA should always be required. 
For category B projects, members may decide which, if any, additional information should be supplied. 
Besides information on the project itself, its environmental and/or social impacts and the international 
standards the parties intend to apply, the ESIA should also contain information that the project 
complies with local legislation and on whether local communities have been consulted and if 
applicable, the outcome of these consultations (para.16).  
The Common Approaches make recommendations on which international standards should benchmark 
projects against. In general, the Common Approaches recommend the ten World Bank Safeguard 
Policies or alternatively the eight IFC Performance Standards. The World Bank policies address the 
areas of Environmental Assessment; Natural Habitats; Forests; Pest Management; Physical Cultural 
Resources; Involuntary Resettlement; Indigenous Peoples; Safety of Dams; International Waterways 
and Disputed Areas (2012). The IFC standards deal with Assessment and Management of 
Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; Labour and Working Conditions; Resource Efficiency 
and Pollution Prevention; Community Health, Safety and Security; Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement; Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources; 
Indigenous Peoples; and Cultural Heritage (2012).  
In addition, members should use the World Bank Group’s Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) 
Guidelines (2007), which are referenced in both abovementioned sets of standards. Alternatively, 
members can choose to benchmark projects against other, stricter international standards such as those 
set by the European Union. However, despite detailing these standards, the Common Approaches 
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contain the get-out clause for members that members may choose to support a project that falls short of 
the chosen standards. In this case, the member state should provide a justification to the OECD 
Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG) (para.28).  
After these steps have been completed, members decide whether to decline or support a project or to 
request additional information. If a project is endorsed, this may be linked to the fulfilment of certain 
conditions, such as the provision of compensation or remedies (para.30). In any case, projects should 
be adequately monitored to ensure compliance with the specified standards and conditions (para.31). 
Beyond this, members are tasked with publicising certain documents and regularly reporting on their 
activities, especially with regards to endorsed category A projects (paras.34-42). Specific conditions 
apply for thermal power plants and nuclear power plants (paras.23&43). The recommendations 
conclude with the sentence specifying that: ‘Members shall give further consideration to the issue of 
human rights, including with regard to relevant standards, due diligence tools and other implementation 
issues, with the aim of reviewing how project-related human rights impacts are being addressed and/or 
might be further addressed in relation to the provision of officially supported export credits’ (para.44).   
 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
In June 2011 the UN member states endorsed the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ 
through the Human Rights Council (Ruggie 2013). The Guiding Principles had been developed by an 
independent expert, Harvard professor John Ruggie, who was appointed the UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights. Under the heading of ‘The State Duty to 
Protect Human Rights’ the Guiding Principles specify that ‘States should take additional steps to 
protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises […] that receive substantial support and 
services from State agencies such as export credit agencies […] including, where appropriate, by 
requiring human rights due diligence (United Nations 2011, pp.4–6).  The Guiding Principles thus 
include an explicit clause that requires states to have a process in place to ensure that ECAs operate 
according to international human rights standards, in cases where this may be an issue. Human rights 
due diligence is defined as a process which ‘should include assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tacking responses, and communicating how impacts 
are addressed. Human rights due diligence:  
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a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute 
to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or 
services by its business relationships; 
b) Will vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the risk of severe human rights 
impacts, and the nature and context of its operations; 
c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may change over time as the 
business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve’ (United Nations 2011, pp.17–
18).  
Furthermore, the Guiding Principles recommend that the process of identifying the actual and potential 
human rights impact should ‘draw on internal and/or independent external human rights expertise; 
[and] involve meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders 
[…]’ (United Nations 2011, p.19). The required actions in response to such an assessment depend i.a. 
on the ‘extent of its [the business actor] leverage in addressing the adverse impact’ (United Nations 
2011, p.21).  
 
Comparison of legal status and substantive content 
Both the OECD Common Approaches and the UN Guiding Principles have the status of 
recommendations, i.e. are not legally binding. Nevertheless they carry some political weight, as all the 
states examined here endorsed them via the OECD and the UN Human Rights Council respectively. 
Albeit not legally binding, it is a policy commitment which other states and also NGOs, 
Parliamentarians and the general public may call upon to hold a government to its own promises.  
There are some substantial differences between the contents of the two regulations. The differences 
regard two main areas, namely firstly the process foreseen to protect from negative human rights 
impacts, and secondly how and whether ‘human rights’ are defined. The OECD Common Approaches 
are clearly a lot more specific on the required procedure. While they outline clear steps from screening, 
over classification and review to monitoring of ongoing projects, the Guiding Principles mostly refer to 
a ‘due diligence process’. Although this is expanded upon, it is by necessity generic as it is addressed to 
all types of business enterprises. In terms of substance, the Guiding Principles are arguably more 
specific and certainly more comprehensive with regards to human rights. The Common Approaches do 
use the term ‘human rights’, however they do not make reference to the International Bill of Rights or 
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any other human rights instrument. Those standards and benchmarks which are referenced to the 
document arguably de facto cover a range of rights, however this is often implicit and far from 
comprehensive. Thus, the EHS Guidelines to some extent cover the rights to health, food and water 
(World Bank Group 2007, pp.25&46–51), as well as a safe work environment (World Bank Group 
2007, pp.38–39&59–76). The Common Approaches themselves make references to the rights of 
indigenous people and the communities’ rights to consulted. Nevertheless, these rights are only part of 
the full spectrum, and there is evidence that other rights, including those to freedom of speech and 
assembly have in the past not been respected (Hildyard 2013, p.4).   
 
4.3 Export Credit Agencies 
Before launching into a detailed analysis of Export Credit Agencies’ (ECAs) operations and state 
policies on them, it will be useful to have a more detailed overview of what ECAs actually are and 
what they do.  
In essence, ECAs are government-linked bodies which provide exporting enterprises with financial 
credits, guarantees or insurance in cases which the private market deems to be too risky (Haniotis 1995, 
p.1; Wolfram 2004, p.14). The private sector may deem the projects too risky to support due to political 
and/or financial factors. Most ECAs offer a range of products. In many cases the two main categories 
are export credit guarantees and investment guarantees (BMWi 2013a; UKEF 2013). The essential 
difference is that, as the names suggest, export credits are granted to support the export of goods or 
services through national enterprises to abroad.  Investment guarantees on the other hand are granted to 
entrepreneurs seeking to build up, revive or alter (hence are investing in) an entire business enterprise 
abroad (BMWi 2013b). In most cases, the projects that ECAs support are outside developed countries, 
i.e. in developing or emerging countries. The latter two types tend to be affected by a higher level of 
financial and political risk. Support may be granted in the short-term, medium-term and long-term. The 
duration of these is defined as less than two years, two to five years and over five years respectively 
(Wolfram 2004, p.7).  
Whilst “no two national export credit systems are identical”, all ECAs do have some degree of 
government involvement in common (Haniotis 1995, p.5). However, the form of this involvement 
differs between countries. The first main difference between various types of ECAs is whether they are 
an integrated governmental agency, or a private body with a public mandate (Keenan 2008, p.2; 
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Mildner 2007, p.19). In either case however, the essential function of the ECA is underwritten by 
public funds. Secondly, national practices differ with regards to whether one body handles all products 
or whether the mandate is split across multiple agencies each handling different types of guarantees. 
 
The core motivation for governments to support exports and foreign investment in these forms is to 
provide a boost for their own national economy (Haniotis 1995, p.2; Hildyard 2013, p.3). Mildner 
breaks this justification down into three elements (Mildner 2007, pp.67–68). Firstly, ECAs serve to 
balance out ‘market failures’. Thus, state-supported export credit providers do not seek to compete with 
private providers, but fill the gap in cases where the latter deem the financial or political risk too high 
to insure at regular rates. The result is that prospective exporters would either be unable to gain credit 
or only at such heightened costs that would put them at a significant disadvantage compared to the 
international competition. The second element of this explanation, namely that of the international 
competition is also the second argument in favour of ECs. Namely, given the fact that many exporting 
countries’ industries receive EC support, the own national companies would be placed at an 
international disadvantage if they were not too supported. Thirdly, ECs also support the domestic 
economy in that they strengthen the exporting industries and thereby promote growth and protect or 
generate employment. For foreign investment, this is also the intent, along with selecting strategic 
enterprises abroad, such as those connected to raw materials, that are believed to a be future strategic 













5. ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES’ IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE GUIDELINES 
Having gained this oversight of the existing regulation, the next step is to analyse to focus on the first 
research question of ‘How and to which extent are Western European ECAs implementing relevant 
human rights regulations?’. To this purpose, we will firstly examine the relevant policies of the three 
ECAs in detail, before moving on to addressing the question of the extent to which these policies are 




The German report gives various details about its EC practice. The inter-ministerial working group (see 
below) which makes the final decisions on whether a project will be supported, states that the main 
criteria for eligibility of a project are ‘the general interest in promoting exports and safeguarding jobs in 
Germany, […] and deals from SMEs [small and medium-sized exporters] are considered to be 
especially eligible for cover’ (BMWi 2013, p.13). Beyond these mind criteria, the report also makes 
mention of further factors to be considered, which included economic law and international regulations 
such as the OECD consensus which intends to ensure fair international competition. Noticeably absent 
in this place is any mention of human rights or any other social standards.  
 
The updated version of the OECD Common Approaches is discussed further on, in the chapter on 
development of export credits (BMWi 2013, p.23). Here the report states that the government considers 
the environmental and social impacts of projects abroad, according to the recommendations made by 
the OECD. The main motivation that is given for the Common Approaches is the economic argument 
of ‘achiev[ing] a level playing field for all suppliers’ (BMWi 2013, p.23). The report also remarks upon 
the facts that specific reference standards are included and there is a concrete reference to relevant 
human rights.  Further on the report provides some details on the process for assessing project 
applications for ‘environmental impacts’, referring to the OECD Common Approaches. This screening 
process applies to projects of at least two years duration and worth of 10 million SDRs (BMWi 2013, 
p.63; Euler Hermes 2013, p.2). Details for those projects which fell into categories A or B and were 




In addition to the information in its annual report, Hermes Euler published a special report on 
environmental and social impacts as covered in the Common Approaches (Euler Hermes 2013). This 
report describes in detail the assessment process that an application for project support undergoes. This 
description essentially outlines, and makes clear reference to, the process set out in the OECD 
Common Approaches (Euler Hermes 2013, pp.5–8).  
 
The report also notes that the practices of Euler Hermes go beyond those prescribed in the Common 
Approaches in some cases. Thus, under certain conditions the ECA does apply the screening and 
assessment procedures to projects also of durations under two years (Euler Hermes 2013, p.10). These 
are projects that would fall into category A if they had a duration of two years or more; are projects 
within a sector that currently is believed to be especially at risk or a case in which there is the German 
company is responsible for an entire major project valued at over €50 million.  
 
Germany reports that in 2012 (after aircraft and ships) the sectors that received most support were 
manufacturing, infrastructure and energy (BMWi 2013, p.60). In 2012, Germany supported export 
credits for a total of twenty category A and B projects, with a total value of €1,4 billion (BMWi 2013, 
p.62). Out of these, ten were category A projects, which amounted to a total value of €843 million. Out 
of 244 applications the ECA conducted a more in-depth assessment of 53 projects, which fell into A or 
B categories according to OECD standards (BMWi 2013, p.63).  
 
Netherlands 
The Dutch ECA, Atradius, conducts social and environmental screening of all applications for export 
credit insurance and foreign investment insurance (Atradius 2013a, p.27). The latest version of the 
OECD Common Approaches was integrated into the national policy for environmental and social 
reviews (Milieu en Sociale Beoordeling) of August 2012 (Atradius 2013a, p.27). The environmental 
and social review process follows the recommendations set out in the Common Approaches, relying on 
information provided by the applicants (Atradius 2013a, p.27; Atradius 2013b, p.5). The ECA 
furthermore stated that it is also involved in the development of the national action plan for human 
rights and business (Atradius 2013a, p.27).  Atradius reports that in 2012 they screened 181 
applications, of which 54 were classified and submitted for further social and environmental review 
(Atradius 2013a, p.28). Out of these ten were classified as category A, five as category B, seventeen as 
category C and twenty-two were held under consideration related to the reputation of the buyer and the 
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related project. The ECA also mentions that it consults with NGOs on an ad hoc basis (Atradius 2013b, 
p.9). The Dutch ECA has large exposures in the oil and gas sector (Atradius 2013a, p.9).  
 
United Kingdom 
ECGD’s annual report 2012-13 touches upon the topic of the revised OECD Common Approaches. 
The report makes explicit mention of the issue of human rights. Thus, it notes the commitment ‘to 
establish how project-related human rights impacts should be addressed in relation to the provision of 
officially supported export credits. This will take into account the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights […]’ (UKEF 2013a, p.49).  
 
Noticeable in the UK is the fact that since 2011 they have been expanding their product range. Thus, 
they introduced a set of new ‘Short-Term products’ which include a new ‘Bond Support Scheme’ as 
well as an ‘Export Working Capital Scheme’. The stated purpose of both of these instruments is that 
they are targeted at export projects ‘on short terms of credit (i.e. typically under two years)’ (UKEF 
2013a, p.26). Their figures show that the popularity seems to be rising steadily.  
 
The ECGD had a policy change in April 2010 in which it effectively reduced the scope of its ethical 
policies, when it decided ‘to follow international agreements related to ethical policies which apply to 
the operation of ECAs and not additionally create, and separately operate, its own policies which go 
beyond those agreements’ (UKEF 2013a, p.50). The report explains that this excludes various of 
ECGD’s products from review, including the new Short-Term products, which would have previously 
undergone an ethical assessment. The screening and categorisation process, as well as the follow-up 
monitoring now reportedly conform to the OECD Common Approaches and the benchmarks set out 
therein (UKEF 2013a, p.50).  There is a ‘how to apply’ guide for prospective exporters which details 
the steps contained in the Common Approaches (UKEF 2013c).  
 
UKEF reports that in 2012-2013, 43 per cent of its support went to ‘aerospace’, 47 per cent went to 
‘defence’ and 10 per cent went to ‘civil’ (UKEF 2013a, p.25). In the previous two annual cycles the 
percentages of civil sector support were 21 per cent and 34 per cent respectively (UKEF 2013a, p.25). 
In 2012-2013, the UK screened 13 applications for environmental, social and human rights impacts, of 






The German ECA reports that in 2012, the state provided investment guarantees for the sum of  €6,1 
billion, the second largest figure in its own history (BMWi 2013, p.52). The majority of supported 
investments went into the automotive and construction industries (BMWi 2013, p.52). The main 
criterion that the website mentions for granting an investment guarantee is that the project must be 
economically viable and have ‘sufficient legal protection for  the investment in the host country’ (PwC 
2013). Bilateral investment treaties usually play a substantial part in enhancing such legal protection 
(PwC 2013). Besides these criteria, there are ethical guidelines in place too. These are presented in a 
fact sheet on ‘environment’ which is available on the website (Euler Hermes 2001). As the title of the 
leaflet suggests, the main focus is on environmental factors. The basic procedure that is followed for 
investment guarantees corresponds to that proscribed in the Common Approaches, i.e. an initial 
screening, which is where relevant followed by a classification of the application into categories A, B 
or C, and in the cases of category A and B projects followed by a further review. All these processes 
occur on the basis of the information provided by the applicant (Euler Hermes 2001, pp.2–3). Contrary 
to the updated Common Approaches however, this leaflet only refers to environmental factors. In some 
cases these might include de facto human rights issues, such as the consideration of indigenous 
people’s territory, however there is no specific mention of general social impacts or human rights in 
particular (Euler Hermes 2001, p.2).  
 
According to Atradius’s reports, the ECA applies the same screening and review procedures to projects 
that are seeking export credit insurance and foreign investment insurance (see above, and Atradius 
2013b, p.10). Atradius reported that in 2012 it insured €188 million worth of foreign investment 
(Atradius 2013a, p.20).  
 
The UK’s policy on investment insurances is ambiguous. One the one hand it would appear that 
investment insurances are subject to the same assessment process as are export credits. What gives this 
impression is the fact that amongst a step-by-step manual on how to apply for overseas investment 
insurance, under step two, applicants are invited to ‘read the guide for applicants on business processes 
and factors, to find out how we decide applications’ (UKEF 2013b). However, this link takes the user 
to a manual on how the agency considers applications for export credits which runs through the process 
described in the OECD Common Approaches. This gives the impression that direct investment 
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guarantees would be subject to the same scrutiny as export credits. However, on the other hand, this 
would contravene ECGD’s own policy of not applying ethical standards beyond those proscribed in 
international guidelines. Since the OECD Common Approaches apply to export credits, applying them 
to investment insurances too would mean going beyond the minimum requirements [besides still 
hoping to get a questionnaire response that would clarify this, I have also emailed them asking to 




A further interesting point of comparison is the institutional arrangement of the different ECAs. As 
mentioned above, there are two main models for ECAs. In one case the ECA is integrated into a 
government ministry, and in the other it is an independent private body, mandated with a large part of 
the administration and execution of export credits. Both models can be found among the cases 
examined here.  
 
The German agency is an example of the ‘outsourced’ model. Thus, the functions of an export credit 
agency are split between a consortium of two private bodies (Euler Hermes Deutschland AG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) which carry out the day to day business, and an inter-ministerial working 
group which has the political oversight and responsibility. This working group is led by the ministry for 
economics and technology (BMWi) and decides on all ‘larger’ applications as well as policy decisions 
(BMWi 2013, pp.13–14). Besides the BMWi, the group also includes representatives from the Ministry 
of  Finance, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMWi 2013, p.14).  
 
Within Euler Hermes, which is the primary partner for export credits, there is a team responsible for 
‘sustainability’ issues, including the initial screening of all applications (Euler Hermes 2013, p.2). This 
team consist of engineers, lawyers and economists. With the caveat that there is no detailed information 
available on the background of the individual members of the sustainability team, there is no indication 
that any of them have specialised in human rights or other issues directly linked to sustainability 
(Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte 2013).  
 
The Dutch export credit agency too is a private body that has been mandated by the state to conduct the 
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functions of an official ECA. In this function, Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. manages official 
Dutch insurance of export credits and foreign investment (Atradius 2013a, p.8). Atradius cooperates 
with the Dutch Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Atradius 2013b, p.6). The 
collaboration takes the form of consultation, advice to the ministries on policy and coordination of 
procedures. Moreover, the ministries review the ECA’s work (Atradius 2013b, p.6). Atradius’s primary 
arrangement is with the Ministry of Finance. A policy change implemented in 2012 moved more 
authority from the state to Atradius, which is now allowed to decide on more applications on their own 
authority (Atradius 2013a, p.8).  
 
The UK is an example of an export credit agency which is integrated within a government ministry. 
Thus, the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) is integrated into the mandate of the Secretary 
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (UKEF 2013a, p.76). The members of the Executive 
Committee all form part of the Senior Civil Service (UKEF 2013a, p.77).  
 
 
5.1 Compliance with Guidelines 
OECD Common Approaches 
The first question then, is to what extent the ECAs’ practice coincides with the recommendations made 
in the OECD Common Approaches. Since the main source of information available to us are the ECAs’ 
own communications, their information on the procedures in place which correspond to those 
recommended by the Common Approaches shall be used to assess compliance. In other words, the 
claim to be implementing something shall be taken as indicator of actual implementation. There are 
clearly issues with this type of measurement (see Source Criticism in the Methodology chapter above). 
For the Common Approaches, one may say that they are for the most part being implemented. The 
agencies’ reports and procedures outlined on the websites refer to the Common Approaches and outline 
in detail what these entail. Based on the information that is available, it would therefore seem that all 
the three ECAs are implementing the procedures set out in the Common Approaches.  
 
That said, there is a minor caveat in the case of Germany. Reading the Euler Hermes report, it was 
noticeable that in the general section on the motives and eligibility criteria for export credits, there is no 
mention of human rights or other social impact assessment. Although these factors are covered later on 
in a separate ‘sustainability’ chapter, the fact that they are not included in the ‘general’ section does 
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give the impression that they are secondary to the financial factors. Moreover, further on in the report, 
when the environmental and social standards are discussed this occurs under the heading 
‘environmentally relevant aspects in the promotion of projects’ (BMWi 2013, p.63). Subsuming social 
impact assessments under the heading of ‘environment’ gives the impression that the social aspects are 
somehow secondary and merely ‘tagged on’ to the environmental assessment. However, this caveat 
refers to nuance and comparative importance. There is no indication from the available information that 
the OECD Common Approaches are not being applied.  
 
 
UN Guiding Principles 
The assessment of whether and to which extent the Guiding Principles are being implemented is 
somewhat more complex. This is mostly the case as contrary to the Common Approaches, the Guiding 
Principles are much broader and do not contain the same type of clearly developed procedures as those 
set out in the Common Approaches. Therefore the assessment of the implementation of the Guiding 
Principles involves more of a value judgement than was the case for the Common Approaches. As was 
outlined above, the Guiding Principles call for states to take steps to ensure that ECAs are not involved 
in human rights abuses, including, ‘where appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence’ 
(United Nations 2011, p.6). The first question we thus need to ask ourselves, is whether the ECAs are 
required to conduct a form of human rights due diligence where this is appropriate. The second 
question relates to the process of due diligence. This is somewhat more complex, but the amongst the 
main feature are that it should cover any adverse human rights impact that the organisation may have 
and that it is ongoing and recognise that human rights risks might change over time. Thirdly, the 
Guiding Principles are also clear that the assessment should involve human rights experts, be they 
internal or external to the organisation. The fourth point considered important here, is the specification 
that part of human rights due diligence is the activity of communicating details of this process to 
externals, in particular stakeholders. Thus, these are the elements that will be considered when 
assessing ECAs’ implementation of the Guiding Principles.  
 
The first question thus is, whether ECAs are conducting human rights due diligence in all cases where 
this is appropriate.  Working on the assumption that in principle all types of enterprise have the 
potential to negatively affect human rights in some form (Ruggie 2010, p.3), one might argue that all 
project applications should undergo some form of human rights screening. This is clearly not the case. 
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First of all, this applies in principle to all products which fall below the OECD threshold of two years 
or a minimal exposure of SDR 10 million. While Euler Hermes indicated that it would also screen 
applications below this threshold if certain risk factors apply, neither the Dutch nor the UK ECA gave 
indications that they followed such a practice. Indeed, as discussed UKEF explicitly adopted a policy 
change to the purpose of limiting screening to such projects as fall within the OECD realm.  
 
A second set of problematic products are foreign investment insurances. Since these are not formally 
covered by the Common Approaches, ECAs are under no formal obligation to conduct any human 
rights due diligence for them whatsoever. The only ECA out of the three examined which 
unambiguously states that it applies the same criteria to investment insurances as it does to export 
credits is the Dutch Atradius. Germany has a set of ethical principles in place, however from the 
information available these focus largely on environmental factors and only consider human rights in 
passing, mostly in relation to indigenous peoples. As mentioned, UKEF’s policy is not entirely clear. 
Their stance on not going beyond international standards would suggest that they do not screen 
investment insurances. However, a somewhat ambiguous link on their website suggests that they might. 
Overall, it would appear that with exception of the Danish ECA, the ECAs do have some form of 
screening in place for investment insurances, however it falls behind that conducted for ECAs. This 
lack of clear procedures for investment insurances has been critically commented upon by various civil 
society actors (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte 2013; Utlu 2013, p.3). Moreover, the bilateral 
investment treaties that usually form the basis for foreign investment have been critiqued for their so-
called ‘stability clauses’ which impose a burden on the host country to not change the business 
environment for the investor. These clauses have been known to effectively bar host governments from 
implementing human rights improvements (Amnesty International 2006).  
 
Projects without a clear location such as aircraft and ships as well as agricultural produce and military 
equipment are excluded from the procedures specified under the Common Approaches. These products 
have special regulations (Euler Hermes 2013, p.3). However, especially given the prevalence of 
support given to these products, a lot more transparency and oversight would be desirable. As the 
figures cited above demonstrated, industrial sectors which are not covered by the OECD Common 
Approaches receive a substantial percentage of official export credit support. The UK is a particularly 
stark example for this, as in 2012-13 civil industries received a mere ten per cent of the support. In 
2010-11 support for civil industries amounted to 34 per cent of total official export credits, the highest 
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in five years (UKEF 2013a, p.25). Nevertheless, this still meant that 66 per cent of officially supported 
export credits were granted to aerospace or defence enterprises.  
 
The second question with regards to the implementation of the Guiding Principles asked which 
evidence is there that the impact assessments cover any adverse human right impacts that could arise 
from the agencies’ practice? Are these flexible enough to ensure that changing situations and new risks 
are captured? In this area too, there are some problematic factors. As analysed above, the OECD 
Common Approaches do not systematically cover all human rights in the first place. Human rights 
experts have emphasised that this focus on environmental and general social impacts may mean that 
certain human rights issues are not picked up on in the screening process and therefore potentially 
problematic projects are not even subjected to the more extensive scrutiny of the review stage (Utlu 
2013). This issue is compounded by the fact that the businesses themselves are the main source of 
information used for the assessments (Euler Hermes 2013, p.6; OECD 2012).  
 
The third question in relation to the Guiding Principles was whether there are human rights experts 
involved in these assessments? Again, this area of ECA practice seems problematic in light of the 
Guiding Principles. As was touched upon above, with the potential exception of Atradius, none of the 
ECAs seem to be employing experts in the fields of human rights to conduct the project assessments.  
 
And fourth, are details of these processes adequately communicated to the public and relevant 
stakeholders in particular? The ECAs clearly do publish a substantial amount of information, including 
with regards to category A projects as required by the Common Approaches. Nevertheless, a lot of the 
agencies’ work continues to happen behind closed doors. UKEF is a particularly strong example of 
resisting even Parliamentary scrutiny.  
  
As the above analysis demonstrated, while the examined ECAs do appear to be implementing the 
OECD Common Approaches, there are several shortcomings with regards to the Guiding Principles.  
 
5.2 Application of Theories 
The second research question asked how existing theoretical models help us to understand these 
patterns in implementation of international standards. The models of institutionalism on the one hand, 
and regime theory and the international legal process model (ILPM) on the other offered competing 
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explanations for this phenomenon. The differences fell into three main areas, namely the view of the 
state on the international stage; the importance of the international norm generating process and thirdly 
the state’s motivation for complying with norms.  
Regarding the view of the state of either a cohesive or a negotiated international actor, the second 
theoretical set appears more applicable. While ECAs would be expected to act as one entity in their 
external relations, there are certain noticeable splits between different official actors. Thus, at least for 
the German and especially the British cases it is clear that the Parliament pursues a different strategy 
than the ECAs themselves, and presumably other state actors such as the finance ministries which 
oversee them. This disjuncture would also provide a partial explanation for why the foreign arms of the 
governments signed up to support both the OECD and the UN Guidelines, but these are not in all 
instances realised in national policy and practice.  
The regime theory/ILPM model also provides a very plausible model for why there is such a 
discrepancy between compliance with the Common Approaches and the Guiding Principles. While the 
Common Approaches are the outcome of political negotiations and bargains between representatives of 
the OECD member states, the Guiding Principles were drawn up by an appointed expert and endorsed 
by the UN members as a final product. Thus, Chayes and Chayes’ argument that states’ compliance 
partly stems from their ability to shape the agreements they accede to seems to apply, as does Koh’s 
emphasis on the importance of the norm creation process.  In this instance however, this explanation 
does not wholly contradict the institutionalist view that states comply because it is in their national-
interest. Although, as was observed above, institutionalists have their doubts regarding the viability of 
international human rights norms due to their state-internal nature, the case of human rights and ECAs 
is a particular one. This is so, because as economic actors, ECAs in this instance straddle the border 
between the international free trade regime and international human rights. Whilst institutionalists 
would struggle to explain why states would want to support human rights in the first place, if one starts 
from the assumption that for some reason, such as internal political pressure, they do, signing off on 
such a lowest-common-denominator agreement as the Common Approaches makes sense. By setting 
the ethical standards together, states are able to ensure that applying such procedures to their ECA does 
not put them at an international competitive advantage. Here too the principle of ‘self-enforcing’ 
sanctions works again, as if one state disregards the standards, others might punish the offender by also 
lowering their standards, thus erasing any benefit gained from the digression.  
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Finally, also regarding the motives for implementation a combination of the two theories offers the 
most satisfactory explanation. Institutionalist self-interest, is a far more convincing explanation for the 
lack of implementation of the Guiding Principles, than the regime theory stance that non-compliance 
will most likely be the result of lacking understanding or capacity. While it is true that the Guiding 
Principles are somewhat more vague than the Common Approaches, they do offer a lot more guidance 
than can be seen realised in the ECAs. And since Western states tend to be well-resourced enough to be 
able to implement those policies for which there is sufficient political will, lack of capacity also does 





















6. CONCLUSION  
 
The above thesis set out to explore the topic of international human rights as applied to national Export 
Credit Agencies. Given the present context of economic globalisation in which the internationalised 
economic structures are not yet fully matched with corresponding political oversight tools, this is an 
area of key importance for an ethically sustainable globalisation. As state actors actively promoting 
foreign trade and investment, ECAs are in a prime position to raise the human rights standards of 
corporations operating abroad.  
 
The way we set out analysing this topic, after getting an overview on previous relevant work, was to 
establish and understand the main relevant international human rights guidelines. The OECD Common 
Approaches and the UN Guiding Principles both address the issue of human rights compliance of 
ECAs, but from rather different angles. While the Common Approaches set out clear procedures, these 
are aimed at ensuring environmental and general social standards of which human rights form only a 
small aspect. The Guiding Principles on the other hand focus primarily on human rights, and 
conversely to the OECD standards define these in terms of international human rights law. However, 
the UN guidelines are aimed at businesses in general and do not contain as developed implementation 
mechanisms as the Common Approaches. An analysis of the policies and practices of three Western 
European ECAs, the Dutch Atradius, the German Euler Hermes and the UK UKEF, primarily showed 
that while implementation of the Common Approaches is high, the Guiding Principles are far less 
applied in practice. Tentative explanations of this phenomenon drew on institutionalism and regime 
theory/international legal process model. Based on plausibility, important factors seem to be the more 
intense political negotiating process involved in the creation of the OECD Common Approaches, 
versus the more removed drafting of the Guiding Principles by an academic expert, albeit in close 
consultation with the states.  
 
The main conclusion however remains the fact that ECAs continue to show significant shortcomings if 
measured against international human rights norms. This is the case, despite the high compliance level 
with the Common Approaches, as these guidelines represent a lowest-common-denominator product 
which in itself has numerous gaps with regards to a thorough human rights policy for ECAs. As 
identified above, these included certain products that are exempt from their process, be it on the basis 
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of industry sector, financial volume or length.  
Moreover, there are several further problematic issues with regards to ECA practice that were not even 
included in the above analysis. The main two are the debt burden imposed on the host countries, which 
is subsequently often deducted from Official Development Assistance, as critiqued by Amnesty 
International and ECA-Watch. A further major issue is the virtual non-existence of grievance 
mechanisms for victims of human rights abuses through ECA-sponsored projects. The fact that these 























Policy and Practice 
The main recommendation that follows from this analysis, is that ECAs and the responsible state 
ministries should subject ECA policy and practices both on export credits and investment insurance a 
thorough review, in light of the standards contained in the Guiding Principles. If states are to be 
coherent in their foreign and domestic policies, they must apply standards they endorse.  Also the 
Common Approaches are in need of a further review that defines human rights in terms of international 
standards, and extends the review procedure to all relevant products, including investment insurance.  
States should also review possibilities for implementing an effective procedure for complaints and 
redress for victims.  
 
Research 
As a largely unexplored topic, the human rights practice of export credit agencies offers plentiful 
research opportunities. These include, but are not limited to, a more indepth analysis of current practice 
on foreign direct investment reviews, e.g. via a comparative analysis of ECA questionnaires to 
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